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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WEST VALLEY CITY,
Appellate No. 950793-CA
Appellant,
Priority No. 15
vs.
KENT R. FULLMER,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
This case is an appeal from a final judgement of the Third
Circuit Court, and Defendant does not contest the jurisdiction
recital of the City under Section 78-2a-3(2) (d), Utah Code
Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
ISSUE:

Did the trial judge correctly dismiss the charge against

Appellee in finding that the vehicle must be moving, and are there
other grounds to support the verdict as recited by the Judge?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City centers its Appeal around the finding of the Court
that the vehicle was not moving, but ignores other statements
in the ruling of the Court, which appear to be sufficient grounds
to support the ruling independent of the "moving-not moving" statement.
RELEVANT FACTS
It is unfortunate that the entire proceedings were not transcribed.
The Defendant had gone to the apartment to retrieve some personal
property at a friends residence, including this gun, which he stated
"that he was told by the person from whom he acquired the gun that it
did not work, or words to that effect".

He had not tested the gun and Wc

retrieving it for the purpose of having a gunsmith determine what
needed to be repaired.

He found that some of the running lights on

the vehicle were not working and proceeded to attempt to make them
work by getting under the dashboard to find a fuse or some bad
connection or whatever it was.

He had placed the gun on the front

seat and removed it from the box in which it had been stored, and
placed the box on the rear seat, and the gun on the front seat, where,
from his moving around and hitting or bumping into the seat, the gun
fell under the armrest (and may have fallen between the seats in
front).
It was in this situation that the officers arrived on the scene and
one talked to him and loaned him a flashlight to work on the wiring
and held it while Mr. Fullmer worked on the wiring under the dash.
At this point, the car had not been moved, and there was no evidence tha
I recall which put him sitting on the front seat, although the City
states only that Kent was in the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
I do not recall if he got the lights fixed, but it was after
these events that the officers requested identification, ultimately
resulting in the finding of an outstanding warrant for some other
cause.

They then searched the vehicle, after arresting Mr. Fullmer

on the warrant, although I believe the car was released to Mr. Fullmers
father, or the owner of it.
In the ruling on the Verdict, the Court determined that the
evidence which Mr. Fullmer gave was not sufficient to take the
gun out of the statutory definition.
The Court also ruled concerning all evidence that the testimony
"'

has credible-credibility problems."
The Court in its ruling also set a standard that to be accessible

under 501 (2) (L) (Utah Code Annotated)— "anything in the vehicle
that's within certainly arms length
carried."

could be said to be

This would be under the statute, according to the Ruling,

the equivalent of being carried on the person or in such close proximity
(as to constitute a carrying or concealment).
The Court also commented"that to place the gun in a stationary car v
the same as placing it in a room someplace."
The evidence showed that he intended to drive the car home that
evening, but when he found the not working light problem, he changed
his intention to be to not drive the car until the lights worked, and
he was working on the lights when the officers arrived.

I do not recall

that he ever did get the lights working satisfactorily, and he
was arrested before he could make a determination of whether or not to
drive.
Incidentally, the security officer for the apartment apparently
called the police, but no evidence of "suspicion" was given by him
or the officers for them to check his Identification. It was
the equivalent of a single isolated unwarranted stop. There was
no further evidence as to whether or not he intended to recase the
gun before he moved the car. (Suspicion being no articulable reason)
It was for all of these and other pieces of the evidence that
the Court made its negative finding of lack of credibility of the
evidence.
SUMMARY~0F THE ARGUEMENT
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY FOUND THE DEFENDANT
NOT GUILTY FOR THE GUN NOT BEING "CARRIED",
FOR THE REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT
CREDIBLE AND DID NOT PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THE DEFENDANT WAS WITHIN ARMS LENGTH
OR READILY ACCESSIBLE TO THE GUN, AND THAT THE
GUN BEING IN AN UNMOVED VEHICLE WAS JUST ANOTHER
STORAGE PLACE UNTIL THE VEHICLE WAS MOVED.
In order to find a defendant guilty, the Court must find in
accordance with Section 76-1-501, Utah Code Annotated, that the
evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the
crime, and that the defendant has the culpable mental state. The
City charged him under a week old statute. Inadequate or no
evidence put him on the drivers seat or within arms reach or
readily accessible to the weapon. There was no testimony on
intent except the fact of the gun and he being in the vehicle.
The Court also found the vehicle to be like a room, until
the vehicle was moved.
Under those facts and the Courts ruling, the ruling was
proper by itself without consideration of the discussion that
the vehicle must be moving. There is no testimony about whether
or not the arm rest was fixed or hinged, so as to make the gun
readily accessible, if the defendant was on the front seat.
The ruling of the court is consistent with the reality of
the fact situations of cars and weapons. It is clear that there
was no evidence of his intent to conceal a weapon in the car. It
accidentally got concealed. At some point it is lawful to carry
the weapon and place it in the car, and at what point does it become

unlawfulto have a gun in a car and to take it out to look at it
(out of its case or holster).

Does that constitute a crime?

or

is there not a crime until the defendant is in the car on the seat
readily accessible to the gun, and determines with finality to be in
the car with the gun encased or not encased.

A citizen would have

difficulty dealing with this statute, as to know what to do.
ARGUEMENT
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY ACUUITTED THE DEFENDANT
BECAUSE THE CITY DID NOT PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIME BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
The City has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Section 76-1-501 Utah Code Annotated.

The Court determined and

made a finding that the evidence was with "

credibility problems."

If the evidence is not credible, a reasonable doubt exists.

If

the evidence is not credible, the City has failed to prove all of
the elements of the crime.

The evidence was therefore not

credible as to the question as to the "
element in the statute.

readily accessible

"

The Court also ruled that to be readily

accessible that the gun must be within arms length, and the
evidence was not credible as to whether or not the defendant was
on the drivers seat, or in front of the drivers seat, and under
the steering wheel, and obviously not within arms length, and when
he was working under the dash, that would be a cramped position and
the readily accessible test would fail, without adequate testimony.
The Statute on Intent is 76-2-304, Utah Code Annotated.
The expression by the Court in the Verdict to the effect that
the "

testimony that certainly has credible—credibility problems."

is a negative statement about credibility of the testimony, otherwise
the Court would not have expressed the word "problems", if that is
not true, then the Court would be expected to state that the testimony was all credible.Credibility is defined in WELISKA'S Case 1926,
131 Atl. 860 at 862.

(headnote #5)

The credibility of testimony, its capacity for
being believed, is one of the things to be settled
before weighing it. It the testimony has not this
quality there is no occasion for weighing it.
As these facets of the case are presented, I feel that the
finding and Ruling of the Court are sufficient on these grounds
alone.

As to the statutory wording being changed, and some still

being similar or unchanged, all of the words of the statute are

are not the same, and are subject to interpretation of all of the
words.

If thewords changed, then the elements must have changed.

The Williams case 636 P2d 1092-1981, as quoted is now 16 years old
and the Legislature is still trying to place a fair law upon the
Statutes.The statute as written leaves much to the discretion of
the police officer and prosecutor attempting to enforce it, especially
as to what point of time, in a case like this, does the actor commit
the conduct proscribed and thence do a criminal act.
Counsel speaks about injury to the public, but the officers on
the scene had no expressed concern for their safety
CONCLUSION
The evidence being "—with credibility problems—", the burden
of proof having failed to be met, the elements and intent having
failed to have been proven, the finding of the Court of Not Guilty
should be sustained by this Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 2nd day of May, 1996.
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Attorney for the Appellee

Certificate of Mailing
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May, 1996.
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ADDENDA

(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment,
or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine
•jiat there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
fupport a conviction for an included offense and the trier of
fgct necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that
included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be
jet aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.
1974
70.1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent
prosecution for offense o u t of same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of
the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that
was or should have ^een tried under Subsection 76-1402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment
for the defendant that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be
established to secure conviction in the subsequent
prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a
finding of not guilty by the trier offsets or in a determination
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of
the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a
judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or
vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment;
or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the
termination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has
been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury
trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However,
termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the
termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the
termination is necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the
trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not
attributable to the state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of
law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom
not attributable to the state makes it impossible to
proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent
a fair trial.
1974
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdiction — Prosecution in
other jurisdiction barring prosecution in
state.
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one
* more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this

state and of another jurisdiction, federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those
terms are defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses.
1973
76-1-405. Subsequent prosecution n o t barred — Circumstances.
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not be barred
under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney
bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to
avoid the sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of
guilt held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on writ of
habeas corpus, coram nobis, or sirrilar collateral attack.
1973

PART 5
BURDEN OF PROOF
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the
offense" defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof,
the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense"
mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence ofjurisdiction and venue are not elements
of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of
the evidence.
1978
76-1-502. Negating defense by allegation o r proof —
When not required.
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense:
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or
other charge; or
(2) By proof, unless:
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of
evidence presented at trial, either by the prosecution
or the defense; or
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the
defendant has presented evidence of such affirmative
defense.
1973
76-1-503. Presumption of fact.
An evidentiary presumption established by this code or
other penal statute has the following consequences:
(1) When evidence of facts which support the presumption exist, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact
must be submitted to the jury unless the court is satisfied
that the evidence as a whole clearly negates the presumed
fact;
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a presumed fact to the jury, the court shall charge that while
the presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts giving rise to
the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact.
1973
76-1-504. Affirmative defense p r e s e n t e d by defendant.
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this code or
other statutes shall be presented by the defendant.
1973

76-2-303

CRIMINAL CODE

180

76-2-303. Entrapment.
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in cooperation
with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order
to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct
merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense
does not constitute entrapment.
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when
causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the
offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct
causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even
though the actor denies commission of the conduct charged to
constitute the offense.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall
hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of
fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit
the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten
days before trial except the court for good cause shown may
permit a later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was
entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the
court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue
may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial. Any
order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment
shall be appealable by the state.
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense
of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall
not be admitted except that in a trial where the defendant
testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for felonies
and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on
entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial.

the actor mistakenly believed the victim to be 14 years of age
or older at the time of the alleged offense or was unaware of
the victim's true age.
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of unlawful sexual
intercourse, a violation of Section 76-5-401, or an attempt to
commit that crime, that the actor mistakenly believed the
victim to be 16 years of age or older at the time of the alleged
offense or was unaware of the victim's true age.
1983

1973

76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication.
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal
charge unless such intoxication negates the existence of the
mental state which is an element of the offense; however, if
recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of
an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk because of
voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a
prosecution for that offense.
IWS

76-2-304^ Ignorance or mistake of fact or law.
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any
prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute an offense,
and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's
reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a
written order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for
interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in
an opinion of a court of record or made by a public
servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law
may constitute a defense to the offense charged, he may
nevertheless be convicted of a lesser included offense of which
he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed.
1974

76-2-304.5. Mistake as to victim's age not a defense.
(1) It is not a defense to the crime of child kidnaping, a
violation of Section 76-5-301.1; rape of a child, a violation of
Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a child, a violation of Section
76-5-402.3; sodomy upon a child, a violation of Section 76-5103.1; or sexual abuse of a child, a violation of Section
76-5-404.1; or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, that

76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a defense — Influence of alcohol or other substance voluntarily
consumed — Definition.
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or
ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental illness
lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense
charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the defenses
known as "insanity" and "diminished mental capacity."
(3) A person who is under the influence of voluntarily
consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not excused
from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental illness.
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect that
substantially impairs a person's mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning. A mental defect may be a congenital condition, the result of injury, or a residual effect of a physical or
mental disease and includes, but is not limited to, mental
retardation. Mental illness does not mean a personality or
character disorder or abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal conduct.
(5) "Mental retardation" means a significant subaverage
general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested during the
developmental period as defined by the current Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association
1990

76-2-307. Voluntary termination of efforts prior to offense.
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in which an
actor's criminal responsibility arises from his own conduct or
from being a party to an offense under Section 76-2-202 that
prior to the commission of the offense, the actor voluntaril)
terminated his effort to promote or facilitate its commission
and either:
(1) gave timely warning to the proper law enforcement
authorities or the intended victim; or
(2) wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness m
the commission.
1"5
76-2-308. Affirmative defenses.
Defenses enumerated in this part constitute affirmative
defenses.
&*
PART 4
JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
76-2-401. Justification as defense — When allowed.
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for an}
offense based on the conduct. The defense of justification ma>
be claimed:

primers and boosters, R.DX, P.E.T.N., electric and
nonelectric blasting caps, exploding cords commonly
called detonating cord, detcord, or primacord, picric
acid explosives, T.N.T. and T.N.T. mixtures, nitroglycerin and nitroglycerin mixtures, or any other chemical mixture intended to explode with fire or force;
(ii) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or similar device; and
(iii) any incendiary bomb, grenade, fire bomb,
chemical bomb, or similar device, including any device, except kerosene lamps, if criminal intent has not
been established, which consists of or includes a
breakable container including a flammable liquid or
compound and a wick composed of any material
which, when ignited, is capable of igniting the flammable liquid or compound or«any breakable container
which consists of, or includes a chemical mixture that
explodes with fire or force and can be carried, thrown,
or placed.
(b) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device" shall not
include rifle, pistol, or shotgun ammunition.
(c) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" means
any substances or materials or combinations which have
been prepared or altered for use in the creation of an
explosive, chemical, or incendiary device. These substances or materials include:
(i) timing device, clock, or watch which has been
altered in such a manner as to be used as the arming
device in an explosive;
(ii) pipe, end caps, or metal tubing which has been
prepared for a pipe bomb; and
(iii) mechanical timers, mechanical triggers,
chemical time delays, electronic time delays, or commercially made or improvised items which, when
used singly or in combination, may be used in the
construction of a timing delay mechanism, booby
trap, or activating mechanism for any explosive,
chemical, or incendiary device.
(d) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" shall not
include rifle, pistol, or shotgun ammunition, or any signaling device customarily used in operation of railroad
equipment.
(2) The provisions in Subsections (3) and (6) shall not apply
o:
(a) any public safety officer while acting in his official
capacity transporting or otherwise handling explosives,
chemical, or incendiary devices;
(b) any member of the armed forces of the United
States or Utah National Guard while acting in his official
capacity;
(c) any person possessing a valid permit issued under
the provisions of Uniform Fire Code, Article 77, or any
employee of such permittee acting within the scope of his
employment;
(d) any person possessing a valid license as an importer, wholesaler, or display operator under the provisions of the Utah Fireworks Act, Sections 11-3-3.2 and
11-3-3.5; and
(e) any person or entity possessing or controlling an
explosive, chemical, or incendiary device as part of its
lawful business operations.
(3) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly
assesses or controls an explosive, chemical, or incendiary
tevice is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
(4) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly:
(a) uses or causes to be used an explosive, chemical, or
incendiary device in the commission of or an attempt to
commit a felony; or

person or property tnrougn me use oi an explosive,
chemical, or incendiary device, is guilty of a felony of the
first degree.
(5) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly
removes or causes to be removed or carries away any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device from the premises where
said explosive, chemical, or incendiary device is kept by the
lawful user, vendor, transporter, or manufacturer without the
consent or direction of the lawful possessor is guilty of a felony
of the second degree.
(6) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly
possesses any explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts is guilty
of a felony of t h e third degree.
1993
76-10-307.

D e l i v e r y to c o m m o n carrier, mailing, o r
placement on premises.
Every person who delivers or cjfeses to be delivered to any
express or rail way company or other common carrier, or to any
person, any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device, knowing
it to be the device, without informing the common carrier or
person of its nature, sends it through the mail, or throws or
places it on or about the premises or property of another or in
any place where another may be injured thereby in his person
or property, is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
1993
76-10-308.

Explosive, c h e m i c a l , or i n c e n d i a r y d e v i c e —
V e n u e of p r o s e c u t i o n for shipping.
Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly delivers any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device to any
person for transmission without the consent or direction of the
lawful possessor may be prosecuted in the county in which he
delivers it or in the county to which it is transmitted.
1993
76-10-309.

Repealed.

1993
PART 4
FENCES

76-10-401. F e n c i n g of shafts a n d w e l l s .
Any person who has sunk or shall sink a shaft or well on the
public domain for any purpose shall inclose it with a substantial curb or fence, which shall be a t least four and one-half feet
high. Any person violating the provisions of this section is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
1973
PARTS
WEAPONS
76-10-501. Uniform l a w — Definitions.
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a
constitutionally protected right, the Legislature finds the
need to provide uniform laws throughout the state. Except as specifically provided by state law, a citizen of the
United States or a lawfully admitted alien shall not be:
(i) prohibited from owning, possessing, purchasing, transporting, or keeping any firearm a t his place
of residence, property, business, or in any vehicle
under his control; or
(ii) required to have a permit or license to purchase, own, possess, transport, or keep a firearm,
(b) This part is uniformly applicable throughout this
state and in all its political subdivisions and municipalities. All authority to regulate firearms shall be reserved to
the state except where the Legislature specifically delegates responsibility to local authorities. Unless specifically authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local
authority may not enact or enforce any ordinance, regulation, or rule pertaining to firearms.

76-10-502

258

CRIMINAL CODE

(2) As used in this part:
(a) (i) "Concealed dangerous weapon" means a dangerous weapon that is covered, hidden, or secreted in a
manner that the public would not be aware of its
presence and is readily accessible for immediate use.
(ii) A dangerous weapon shall not be considered a
concealed dangerous weapon if it is a firearm which is
unloaded and is securely encased.
(b) "Crime of violence" means aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery,
burglary, housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, arson
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or an
attempt to commit any of these offenses.
(c) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background check conducted by a licensed firearms
dealer on every purchaser of a handgun through the
division or the local law enforcement agency where the
firearms dealer conducts business.
(d) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the
manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing
death or serious bodily injury. The following factors shall
be used in determining whether a knife, or any other item,
object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous
weapon is a dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any;
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or
thing was used; and
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object, or thing may be used.
(e) "Dealer" means every person who is licensed under
crimes and criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling, leasing, or otherwise
transferring a handgun, whether the person is a retail or
wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise.
(f) "Division" means the Law Enforcement and Technical Services Division of the Department of Public Safety,
created in Section 53-5-103.
(g) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, 6awedoff shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any device that
could be used as a dangerous weapon from which is
expelled a projectile by action of an explosive.
(h) "Fully automatic weapon" means any firearm which
fires, is designed to fire, or can be readily restored to fire,
automatically more than one shot without manual reloading by a single function of the trigger.
(i) "Firearms transaction record form" means a form
created by the division to be completed by a person
purchasing, selling, or transferring a handgun from a
dealer in the state.
(j) "Handgun" means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm
of any description, loaded or unloaded, from which any
shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged, the length
of which, not including any revolving, detachable, or
magazine breech, does not exceed 12 inches.
(k) "Prohibited area" means any place where it is
unlawful to discharge a firearm.
(1) "Readily accessible for immediate use" means that a
firearm or other dangerous weapon is carried on the
person or within such close proximity and in 6uch a
manner that it can be retrieved and used as readily as if
carried on the person.
(m) "Sawed-off shotgun" or "sawed-off rifle" means a
shotgun having a barrel or barrels of fewer than 18 inches
in length, or in the case of a rifle, having a barrel or
barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any danger-

ous weapon made from a rifle or shotgun by alteration,
modification, or otherwise, if the weapon as modified has
an overall length of fewer than 26 inches.
(n) "Securely encased" means not readily accessible for
immediate use, such as held in a gun rack, or in a closed
case or container, whether or not locked, or in a trunk or
other storage area of a motor vehicle, not including a glove
box or console box.
1996
76-10-502. W h e n w e a p o n d e e m e d l o a d e d .
(1) For the purpose of this chapter, any pistol, revolver,
shotgun, rifle, or other weapon described in this part shall be
deemed to be loaded when there is an unexpended cartridge,
shell, or projectile in the firing position.
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed to be loaded
when an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is in a
position whereby the manual operation of any mechanism
once would cause the unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile
to be fired.
(3) A muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed to be loaded
when it is capped or primed and has a powder charge and ball
or shot in the barrel or cylinders.
1990
76-10-503.

P u r c h a s e or p o s s e s s i o n of d a n g e r o u s
weapon/handgun — Persons not permitted to

have — Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of
violence under the laws of the United States, this state, or
any other state, government, or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has been
declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in
his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a
firearm or sawed-off shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony
may not have in his possession or under his custody or
control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of
a third degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a
firearm, explosive, or incendiary device he is guilty of a
second degree felony.
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any
handgun described in this part who:
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other
state;
(ii) is under indictment;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance
as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as
provided in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159,107 Stat. 1536 (1993), or has
been committed to a mental institution;
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the
United States;
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces
under dishonorable conditions; or
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the
United States, has renounced such citizenship,
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
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76-10-504. C a r r y i n g c o n c e a l e d d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n .
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsections (2) and (3):
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(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon
which is not a firearm on his person or one that is readily
accessible for immediate use which is not securely encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his
residence, property, or business under his control is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor.
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit
who carries a concealed dangerous weapon which is a
firearm and that contains no ammunition is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shotgun or a
sawed-off rifle is guilty of a second degree felony.
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a
crime of violence as defined in Section 76-10-501, and the
person is a party to the offense, the person is guilty of a second
degree felony.
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person engaged in the lawful taking of protected or unprotected wildlife
as defined in Title 23 from carrying a concealed weapon or a
concealed firearm with a barrel length of four inches or greater
as long as the taking of wildlife does not occur:
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of
that municipality's ordinances; or
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section
41-6-1.

1995

76-10-605. Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle, on
street, or in prohibited area.
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by law, a person may not
carry a loaded firearm:
(a) in or on a vehicle;
(b) on any public street; or
(c) in a posted prohibited area.
(2) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor.
1990

76-10-505.5. Possession of a dangerous weapon, firearm, or sawed-off shotgun on or about school
premises — Penalty.
( D A person may not possess any dangerous weapon, firearm, or sawed-off shotgun at a place that the person knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is on or about school premises.
(2) (a) Possession of a dangerous weapon on or about school
premises is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) Possession of a firearm or sawed-off shotgun on or
about school premises is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) This section applies to any person, except persons authorized to possess a firearm as provided under Sections
53-5-704, 53-5-705, 53A-3-502, 76-10-510, 76-10-511, 76-10523, and Subsection 76-10-504(2) and as otherwise authorized
by law.
(4) This section does not prohibit prosecution of a more
serious weapons offense that may occur on or about school
premises.
1993
76-10-506.

T h r e a t e n i n g w i t h or u s i n g d a n g e r o u s
w e a p o n in fight or quarrel.
Every person, except those persons described in Section
76-10-503, who, not in necessary self defense in the presence
of two or more persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous
weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully
uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A
Tiisdemeanor.
1992
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76-10-509.4

76-10-508. Discharge of firearm from a vehicle, near
highway, or in direction of any person, building, or vehicle.
(1) (a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous
weapon or firearm:
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle;
(ii) from, upon, or across any highway;
(iii) at any road signs placed upon any highways of
the state;
(iv) at any communications equipment or property
of public utilities including facilities, lines, poles, or
devices of transmission or distribution;
(v) at railroad equipment or facilities including
any sign or signal;
(vi) within Utah State Park buildings, designated
camp or picnic sites, overlooks, golf courses, boat
ramps, and developed beaches; or
(vii) without written permission to discharge the
dangerous weapon from the owner or person in
charge of the property within 600 feet of:
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building; or
(B) any structure in which a domestic animal
is kept or fed, including a barn, poultry yard,
corral, feeding pen, or stockyard.
(b) It shall be a defense to any charge for violating this
section that the person being accused had actual permission of the owner or person in charge of the property at the
time in question.
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B
misdemeanor unless the actor discharges a firearm under any
of the following circumstances not amounting to criminal
homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which case it is a
third degree felony:
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of
any person or persons, knowing or having reason to
believe that any person may be endangered;
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable structure as
defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2), discharges a firearm in
the direction of any building; or
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges a firearm in the direction of any vehicle.
(3) This section does not apply to a person:
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when, that
person is in lawful defense of self or others; or
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in
Sections 23-20-1.5 and 76-10-523 and as otherwise provided by law.
1995
76-10-509. P o s s e s s i o n of d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n b y minor.
( D A minor under 18 years of age may not possess a
dangerous weapon unless he:
(a) has the permission of his parent or guardian to have
the weapon; or
(b) is accompanied by a parent or guardian while he
has the weapon in his possession.
(2) Any minor under 14 years of age in possession of a
dangerous weapon shall be accompanied by a responsible
adult.
(3) Any person who violates this section is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor upon the first offense; and
(b) a class A misdemeanor for each subsequent offense.
1993 (2nd a & )

76-10-509.4. Prohibition of p o s s e s s i o n of c e r t a i n w e a p o n s by minors.
assault.
( D A minor under 18 years of age may not possess a
Every person having upon his person any dangerous handgun.
veapon with intent to unlawfully assault another is guilty of
(2) Except as provided by federal law, a minor under 18
1 class A misdemeanor.
1973 years of age may not possess the following:

T6-10-507.

P o s s e s s i o n of d e a d l y w e a p o n w i t h i n t e n t to
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the note in question was "in reality * • *
a contract by her as surety for her husband,"
saying that, if it was such a contract, "then,
without regard to its form, it would be Toid
Tinder the Act of June 8, 1893 (P. L. 344)."
After reading the evidence, written and
oral, we find no abuse of discretion.
The order appealed from is affirmed

"Klan C h u r c h ^ n J u T ^ S ^ B S S ^ n ^ ^ ^ ^
and oh July. 24, 1924, in Bangor, and that his
resignation was accepted; (3) that on October 25,1924, he -was paid the amount of back
salary due him to that date. On the brief
defendants' counsel has argued another point,
viz. that by accepting the office of "Kleagle,"
and performing the duties thereof, the plaintiff had himself broken the contract, or at
least had abandoned his position-of pastor,
t and renounced the contract; -• - : We need only to say that an examination
[of the record discloses so many improbabiliBENNETT v. HATHORN et al.
ties, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the
(Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. IFeb.. 5, I evidence that the jury were fully warranted
j in accepting the \ plaintiff's version of fne
1926.)
transactions in question; ^.We. take occasion
Evidence <S=>584(3)—Weight to be given evi- to repeat, as frequently stated on former ocdence depends, not on number of witnesses, casions, that the weight to be given to evibut on quality of testimony.
dence presented depends not so much on the
The weight to be given evidence depends number of witnesses as upon the quality or
not so much on number of witnesses as on the power of their testimony-to convince of the
quality or power of their testimony to convince truth'.
of the truth.
I Motion overruled.
On Motion from Superior Court,~Penobscot
County, at Law.
. Action by Milton C. "Bennett against F.
WELISKA'S CASE.
Herbert Hathorn and another. On general
motion by defendants for a.new trial. Mo- (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Feb. 5.
L926.)
tion overruled.
Argued before WTLSON, c. J.,. Ana FHJLLr 1. Master and servant <@=>388—Conclusive preBROOK, DUNN. MORRILL. STURGIS. and I sumption under statute that dependency of
BASSETT, JJ.
child under 18 years is entire.
Though Laws 1921, c. 222, § 1, relating to
Pattangall, Locke & Perkins, of Augusta,
dependents, is ambiguous, one intended meanfor plaintiff.
is that, when no dependent parent survives
Fellows & Fellows, of Bangor, for defend- ing
deceased employee,' conclusive presumption is
ants.
that dependency of decedent's less than 18 year
old legitimate child is entire, providing state of
PER CURIAM. This is an action to re- child when, parent died was that of reliance on
cover stipulated compensation as the pastor him for subsistence.
of the "Klan Church," so called, in Brewer 2. Master and servant $=>388 — Dependency
and Bangor, under an alleged contract becondition of compensation.
tween the plaintiff and the defendants. * The
Dependency is condition nrecedent to award
action is based upon a typewritten^ letter, | of -compensation.
dated at Brewer, December 19,^1923, signed
with a typewriter, "F. Herbert Hathorn, 3. Master and servant <g=>388—Test of (child's
dependency stated.
Brewer, D. D. Terrill, Bangor," in which the
period of employment is fixed at 18 months,
Mere giving of assistance by *' divorced faand the compensation at $45 per week and ther living apart from daughter .does .not of itD
4
house rent. The* * plea ' is'tiy/-general issue! self make ^daughter dependent, but further test
There was no" denial of signature by affidavit is whether .she had necessity. therefor;in her life
tinder rule X. The case~is before 5 the law I station, and whether she counted on/guciucontributions for her livelihood.
court upon a general motion by-defendants
for a new trial.
4. Evidence ^=»596 (I)—'^Vague- and unsatisUnder the general issue the defendants in- factory" testimony defined.
"Vague- and 'unsatisfactory"^testimony is
troduced evidence which they assert supports
the following defenses: (1) That "they did not that .which,is dim and shadowy and fails to recontract with the plaintiff to serve-as pastor lieveith^, mind'Of ;the trier of facts from doubt
or uncertainty.
of the-"man C h u r ^
signed, nor authorized .any, person • tof affix- 5;-Evtdence^==>588--<,Credilj|Iity,f'of testimony
must be decided *bef ore weighing i t
their names to, the letter : in "question, and
that neither of them saw or knew of the let"Credibility".- of * testimony which; is * its cater until several months after i t s date ;,, (2) 1I pacity, for bemg:/beUejedtVmust ^be -settled be£=»For other cases see -same topic and KEY-Nt)

, in ail .Key-Numbered DUesta^and Indexei

(131 A.)

fore weighing it, since there is no occasion for
weighing it if it has not this quality.
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words
and Phrases, First and Second Series, Credible
—Credibility.]
6. Master and servant <§=>417(7)-.industrial
Accident Commission's decision of facts conclusive.
Where Industrial Accident Commission had
decided certain evidence was vague and unsatisfactory, held, province of such commission, which
has exclusive right to decide facts, cannot be invaded by arbitrary unauthorized court order
that such testimony must be accepted as involving both persuasion and decision.
On Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court,
Hancock County, in Equity.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mary Weliska for the death of
Stanley Weliska, her father, claimant, opposed by the Lincoln Pulp Wood Company.
From an order of the Industrial Accident
Commission denying compensation, claimant
appeals. Appeal dismissed and decree affirmed.
Argued before WILSON, C. J., and PHlLrBROOK, DUNN, MORRILL, STURGIS, and
BARNES, JJ.
Peter- M. McDonald and Aretas E. Stearns,
both of Rumford, for appellant.
Louis 0. Stearns, of Bangor, for appellee.
DUNN, J. The net result of the record
is that the appeal from the decree denying
compensation to the child of the fatally injured workman, on the ground of the Jack
of proof of dependency, must be dismissed.
[1] The statute applicable appears to be
ambiguous. After defining "dependents" as
members of an employee's family or next of
kin, whom he was sustaining either wholly
or partly by his earnings when he was injured, there is, relationally to the conclusive
presuming of the total dependency of children, in the case of an employee deceased,
the clause following:
"(c) A child or children, including adopted
and step-children under the age of eighteen
years for over said age, but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) upon the parent with whom he is or they are living, or upon
whom he is or they are dependent at the time
of the death of said parent, there being no surviving dependent parent. In case there is more
than one child thus dependent, the compensation
shall be divided equally among them." 1921
Laws, chap. 222, § 1.
Resolving it, that legislation, by the accepted use of language, has for one intended
meaning this: When no dependent parent is
surviving a deceased employee, conclusive
presumption is that the dependency of the
dead man's less than 18 year old legitimate
child is entire, providing the state of the

child when the parent died, and notwithstanding they were-living apart from one
another, was that of reliance upon him for
subsistence.
[2, 3] "Dependency," said Chief Justice Cornish, in <words that still are living, "is a
condition precedent to award of compensation." Henry's Case, 124 Me. 104, 126 A.
286. The mere receiving of assistance, on
the authority of the same decision, does not
of itself make the recipient a dependent
Granting that there were contributions, the
yet further test for dependency is: Had the
accepting one necessity therefor in his life
station, and were they counted on by him
for his means of livelihood?
While Stanley Weliska was working regularly for, and because and out of his employment by, the Lincoln Pulp Wood Company, in the Hancock county woods, on June
3, 1924, the limb of a falling tree accidentally struck his skull and fractured it. He died
that very day.
Four years before his wife had divorced
him, for utter desertion over the three-year
period immediately preceding her libel, in
Oxford county. At the same time, the one
child of the marriage which met judicial
dissolution was decreed by the court in care
and custody of the mother with whom she
always had lived, and now is living in the
mother's new marriage home in Massachusetts. This child, aged 12 years, is the petitioner in these proceedings. The divorced
husband never remarried. If he died leaving
living parents, for anything that is shown,
they are self-supporting.
At the hearing, there was but one issue,
ft of the petitioner's dependency; the respondent's answer raising nothing else. Mitchell's Case, 121 Me. 455, 118 A. 287, <33 AL. R. 1447; McCollor's Case, 122 Me. 136,119
A. 194.
There is evidence that the father at odd
intervals, to within three or four months of
the fateful day, came from Rumford or elsewhere in Maine, as the place of his employment was, to Lawrence in the other state,
and meeting his child more or less slyly and
clandestinely from her mother, made to the
child gifts of money, the most of which has
been appropriated toward, and some of which
is in saving for, her maintenance.
So the child attested. And her mother and
a neighbor witnessed similarly, but with not
so much detail.
[4] The Industrial Accident. Commission,
Chairman Thayer sitting, characterized the
testimony as "vague and unsatisfactory."
This is taken to mean that it was dim and
shadowy and failed to relieve the mind of
the trier of facts from doubt or uncertainty.
No other evidence being offered on the indispensable point of dependency, the petition
was denied.
' Argument is for or agninst'the proposition

that, as the testimony was uncontradicted,
a consenting mind ought to have received it,
and on reflection found it sufficient for the
awarding of compensation.
The appellant loses.
[5] The credibility of testimony, its capacity for being believed, is one of the things
to be settled before weighing i t If the testimony has not this quality there is no occasion for weighing i t The testimony pressed
upon attention was tested and found wanting. For probatory purpose it was as light
as nothingness, in the faithful though perhaps erroneous judgment of the commission,
and hence negative decision was recorded.
That decision ended controversy.
[6] As the compensation law is, the right
to decide facts is invested exclusively in the
Industrial Accident Commission, and the
province of that tribunal may not be invaded by an arbitrary unauthorized court order
that certain testimony must be accepted as
involving both persuasion and decision. OrfFs
Case, 122 Me. 114, 119 A. 67.
Appeal dismissed.
Decree below affirmed.

deny facts which writ sets out or state other
facts sufficient in law to defeat petitioner's
claim.
5. Mandamus <©=*165—Petitioner may demur to
return.
Petitioner may, instead of challenging some
matter of fact alleged by opposite party, demur to return to alternative writ of mandamus
advancing issue which, as if raised by traverse,
he mnst maintain, in view of Rev. St c 107*
§ 18.
*
6. Mandamus <§=>( 87 (4)—Justice may reserve
questions of law for fuil court.
Justice hearing petition for mandamus may
reserve questions of law for full court.
7. Mandamus <§=>!87(4,9)—Exceptions arguable only after judgment and decree; in arguing exceptions, erroneous ruling in law or
misuse of discretionary control must be
shown.
Exceptions saved in mandamus proceeding are arguable on certification of Chief Justice only after judgment and decree, in view
of Rev. St. c. 107, § 17, and excepter must
show, not merely granting or withholding of
writ, but erroneous ruling in law or parent
misuse of discretionary control.

8. Mandamus <§=>I87(4)—There is no authority
for deciding,disputed facts by full court.
A mandamus case may not be brought to
full court before ordering peremptory writ,
LIBBY et a!, v. YORK SHORE WATER CO. since there is no authority for deciding disputed
facts in mandamus proceeding by full court.
(Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Feb. 5,
1926).
9. Mandamus <§=>187(4)—Proceeding not considered by full court on reservation of ques1. Mandamus <§=>I54(2)—Petition addressed
tion of issuing alternative writ.
to individual member of Supreme Judicial
Full court will not review proceedings in
Court.
when brought up by reservation of
Petition for mandamus should be addressed^ mandamus
question whether alternative writ is issuable
personally to individual member of Supreme Ju- on
facts, since such proceedings must
dicial Court, distinguishably from him presid- stayagreed
ing as justice in term time, in view of Rev. St. pass. where they begin till they run their comc. 107, § 17.
On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court,
2. Mandamus <§=» 171—Limitary provisions affect neither time and place of hearing nor York County, at Law.
notice to others concerned.
Petition by Fred M. Libby and others for
Limitary provisions affect neither time and mandamus against the York Shore Water
place of hearing petition for mandamus, nor Company. Motion to dismiss was made, and
previous notice which others concerned shall question whether alternative writ was dishave, but corrective means will reach discrecretionally issuable was reserved for the law
tion unmistakably abused.
court Report discharged.
3. Mandamus <©=> 159—Hearing petition has to
Argued before WILSON, C. J., and PHILdo with "alternative writ."
Hearing of petition for mandamus has to BROOK, DUNN, MORRILL, and BASdo with granting or denying of "alternative SETT, JJ.
writ," which determines nothing in favor of
Stewart & Hawkes, of York Village, for peeither party, but has resemblance to interlocu- titioners.
tory order to show cause, and is obeyed by anFrank D. Marshall and Charles J. Nichols,
swering.
both of Portland, for defendant.
• [Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words
and Phrases, First and Second Series, AlterDUNN, J. The overt phase of this case is
native Writ.]
that of nonconformity to statutable proce4. Mandamus @=> 164 (2)—Requirements of re- dure in mandamus proceedings. This aspect
will be seen against the history and the rule.
turn stated.
These petitioners own certain land in the
Where return, which is answer to alternative writ, does not show compliance with man- town of York. They are desirous that their
date or command of such writ, it must either property have the use of water. The public

